The pulse of clean trade.
World trade across eleven clean-technology supply chains reached $3.87 trillion in 2024, up from $2.56 trillion in 2012. Growth came in two phases, 1.7 percent a year to 2019 and 6 percent a year since, and EVs and batteries supplied about two thirds of the increase. The figures come from the NZIPL’s green dictionary, counting full value chains from raw materials to factory-building equipment, each product once, in its most downstream chain. Several baskets also sweep in generic machinery and chemicals that serve other industries, so part of the total moves with world trade in manufactures; the panel notes say where.
The total peaked at $3.89 trillion in 2023 and eased 0.6 percent in 2024, a year in which EVs, transmission, and nuclear still set records while the other eight chains sat below peaks from 2021–2023, mostly the commodity-price surge. All values are nominal, and prices cut both ways: solar unit values fell about 75 percent over the window, so its dollar line hides volume growth, while transformer unit values rose more than 60 percent after 2020 and inflate part of transmission’s record. Much of the 2024 easing is the same mechanism; solar unit values dropped about 40 percent in that year alone while volumes kept climbing. Panel 06 draws the mechanism product by product.
Six views answer one question.
Is each chain growing or shrinking, which segments of it are moving, who ships and buys it, where each buyer’s imports come from, and how much of the dollar line is price? Click any chain chip, chart line, or table row to focus the panels. Panels 01 through 05 run 2012–2024 on the canonical chain table; panel 06’s product close-ups state their own scopes. Every panel downloads its data as CSV and copies as an image.
Ten of eleven chains grew; EVs pulled away
Downstream and midstream carry four fifths
China ships a sixth of it
America overtook China as the top buyer
The big buyers raised their China share; America cut it
Cheaper goods, flat dollars
The numbers. Nominal US dollars, mirrored across reporters (BACI). Panels 01 through 05 read one canonical chain table projected from the NZIPL green dictionary: each product counts once, in its most downstream chain, and the four positions, upstream, midstream, downstream, and equipment, are share-weighted within each chain. Panel 06 uses single HS6 product codes, narrower than any chain, with scopes and windows stated on the panel. Shares are shares of world trade in the selected chain. *Taiwan reports as “Other Asia, nes” in BACI.
The controls. Click a country line or table row to pivot the dashboard to that economy: exports when clicked among the exporters, imports among the importers. Click again, use the ✕, or press Esc to return to the world view. The Downstream toggle on panel 02 re-scopes panels 03 through 05 to final goods only (2012–2024). Rankings in every mode show the top 10 of the current selection; the country pivot highlights the pinned economy’s line on panel 05 and does not re-scope panel 06.
Who is up, who is down.
The same data as a ledger: values, shares, and growth, with a sparkline drawing each row’s path. Switch between countries and chains, exports and imports. With a chain selected, the second mode disaggregates its downstream into HS6 products; with an economy pinned, it becomes that economy’s ledger.
One basket, two speeds.
The basket grew 1.7 percent a year from 2012 to 2019, then 6.1 percent a year from 2019 to 2024. Electric vehicles and batteries supplied $847 billion of the $1,310 billion increase, about two thirds. Underneath that acceleration, the geography of the clean industrial base kept reorganizing.
China, eleven times
China’s share of world exports, 2012→2024, one scale (0–40%) across all eleven · click a chain to open it
China became the supply pole.
27→36% heat pumps · 13→20% wind · 5→17% batteries
China is the top exporter in nine of the eleven chains and raised its world export share in every one of them between 2012 and 2024: heat pumps 27 to 36 percent, wind 13 to 20 percent, batteries 5 to 17 percent. The two exceptions are biofuel, led by the United States, and nuclear, where counting upstream puts Kazakhstan’s uranium narrowly on top. Its own import share fell from 14.4 to 13.2 percent as it substituted domestic supply. Export shares understate production; much of what China makes, China installs.
America became the demand pole.
6 of 11 chains, top importer · 20% of nuclear imports · 17% of EV imports
The United States is the top importer in six of the eleven chains, including EVs, wind, solar, and transmission, and its import share rose in nine of the eleven, reaching 20 percent of world nuclear imports and 17 percent of EV imports. China leads the import side of five chains, largely on ores and processed inputs feeding its battery, electrolyzer, and magnet industries. Economies are ranked singly; the EU as a bloc rivals or exceeds the United States in several chains.
The risers are joining the chains.
2.2→3.3% Mexico · 0.9→1.5% India · 0.3→1.1% Vietnam
Mexico, India, and Vietnam gained share on both sides of the ledger between 2012 and 2024: Mexico from 2.2 to 3.3 percent of world clean-chain exports, India from 0.9 to 1.5, Vietnam from 0.3 to 1.1, each importing more at the same time. That pairing is the signature of economies entering supply chains rather than only buying from them.
Dollars understate volume.
-75% solar unit value · ×7.3 implied volume · 87% of the 2022 peak
Solar trade sits at 87 percent of its 2022 dollar peak over years when installations kept climbing; module prices fell about 90 percent since 2008 in dollars per watt. For deflating technologies the dollar line records cheaper goods shipping in growing volume. Panel 06 draws the mechanism product by product: value flat, implied volume climbing, and the wedge between them is the price effect.
Read the numbers with care.
Every figure on this page traces to one generated table, data/products.csv, projected from the NZIPL green dictionary and priced from BACI. These are the caveats that matter before quoting any of it.
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Prices
Values are nominal.
+60% transformer unit values since 2020 · 8 of 11 peaks in 2021–2023
No price deflation is applied. Where technology prices collapsed, solar modules and lithium-ion cells above all, dollar trade understates volume growth. Where equipment prices rose instead, transformer unit values up more than 60 percent since 2020, dollar trade overstates it, and transmission’s record high is partly price. Eight of the eleven chain peaks date to 2021–2023, the commodity and freight spike; below peak does not mean below-peak volume.
Panel 06 divides trade value by shipped weight for five HS6 products. Unit values mix price with product composition, a known IMF caveat, and dollars per kilogram are a floor on the true price decline because efficiency per kilogram improved. Solar’s code also contains LEDs, so its close-up uses China’s exports, the module mode of the code; the large-transformer code sits outside the green dictionary and is read directly. The quoted module and battery-pack prices are external figures (IRENA/pvXchange, BloombergNEF), cited, not drawn from this data.
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The basket
One table, four positions, one window.
11% upstream in the headline · 2012–2024 every panel · 2% median threshold
Membership comes from the NZIPL green dictionary, projected to an HS12-native table (
data/products.csv) with four positions per chain: upstream minerals, midstream processing, downstream goods, and the production equipment that builds the factories. A product in several chains counts once, in its most downstream chain, so chains sum to the total exactly, in every panel. Upstream counts in the headline total, 11 percent of the 2024 figure, a deliberate departure from the Atlas root’s manufactured convention, and is drawn as its own tier.Every panel runs 2012 to 2024, thirteen years on one HS nomenclature. An HS02 reconstruction of the earlier years was tested against the HS12 series over the thirteen overlap years; six chains and the all-chain total diverged past the 2 percent median threshold, so every chain is quoted on the same window and no pre-2012 extension ships. The test is documented in the methods appendix.
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Upper bounds
Dual-use inflation.
40% of the electrolyzer chain is equipment
The dictionary maps generic machinery, polymers, and metals into chains at stated weights, and several baskets remain upper bounds: 40 percent of the electrolyzer chain is production equipment swept in through an HS92 catch-all code, and wind components include generic gearing and castings. Treat levels in those chains as ceilings. The drill-down names every code, and the ranking and partner panels carry a per-chain composition note, so the reader can judge each basket. Where a code’s technology share has a reviewed measurement, the drill-down prints it beside the code.
One gap runs the other way. Undenatured ethanol (HS 220710), the code carrying most fuel-ethanol trade including nearly all of Brazil’s, is absent from the dictionary, so the biofuel chain understates those flows. The omission is filed with the dictionary’s maintainers.
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Attribution
Two registers, measured where an instrument exists.
6 of 11 chains carry a coverage verdict · 22 codes with published measurements · 362 of 653 memberships read
A components register decomposes six chains into named components with cost shares from national-laboratory and agency sources, and an attribution register estimates, code by code where an instrument exists, how much of a code’s trade is the technology, from tariff-line trade data, end-use series, or market-size comparisons, in descending strength: half to four fifths of the steel-towers code is wind towers, depending on the market (US 53.8 percent, EU 78.8). Wind, solar, and transmission pass a coverage bar set at 80 percent of each chain’s filed cost ceiling; batteries, EVs, and heat pumps fall short, covering 57.6, 51.1, and 30 percent of their cost denominators against bars of 60, 80, and 48. Reviewed measurements print in the rankings drill-down as a measured share; they annotate, and no figure on this page is rescaled by them.
Seven memberships are parked: the measured bound contains the 20 percent materiality floor, so the row records its interval and settles nothing. Transformer parts read 12.1–21.2 percent, solar glass 19.9–24.0, PV frames roughly 10–40, EV power electronics 11–25, small vapour turbines 10–23, the cathode-and-electrolyte heading at least 7.6, and refined rapeseed oil near zero to 50. The adjudication registry behind the tiers has read 362 of 653 dictionary memberships; while coverage is incomplete no attributed total ships, and the headline stays a full-value footprint. The adjudication that narrowed the dictionary is written up in the appendix linked below.
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Quoting the total
A footprint, wider than the IEA figure.
$200B IEA, narrow definition · 16% of world merchandise exports
The IEA puts world trade in clean technologies narrowly defined near $200 billion in 2023, under 1 percent of world goods trade. The eleven-chain basket here counts full value chains, including electric vehicles, and equals about 16 percent of world merchandise exports ($24.4 trillion in 2024, WTO). The two answer different questions; quote them accordingly.
Export shares also miss what is made and installed at home. China’s solar export share of 23 percent coexists with a production share near 80 percent, and the chain basket is several times broader than PV-specific products, which dilutes the share further.
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Chain-specific
Two chains carry a note everywhere.
$970B EV downstream, an upper bound · 870390 the residual code
The EV chain’s finished vehicles travel under HS 870390, which also covers some conventional cars; the dictionary’s own EV code exists only in the 2022 nomenclature and maps back to this broader parent. Plug-in hybrids share codes with conventional cars and stay outside. Read the EV downstream level, $970 billion in 2024, as an upper bound.
With upstream counted, Kazakhstan’s uranium exports edge Russia’s fuel and reactor trade at the top of the nuclear chain. The ferronickel flow that once distorted nuclear now sits in geothermal, where it lifts Indonesia to fourth among exporters. Both notes travel with their chains.
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The source
Conventions of the trade data.
X = M mirrored by construction · TWN reports as Other Asia, nes
Taiwan reports as “Other Asia, nes” in the underlying BACI data and is labeled Taiwan here. The source mirrors and harmonizes both sides of every flow on an FOB basis, so world exports equal world imports by construction and a world total can be quoted from either side.
What the 2025 data will test.
Every claim above is a 2012–2024 reading. The next BACI release extends the window by a year; these are the findings it will confirm, sharpen, or retire.
Does the fast phase hold?
Growth ran 6 percent a year from 2019 to 2024, and the total eased 0.8 percent in 2024 as solar and battery unit values fell. Dollar totals can stall while the buildout continues; panel 06 separates price from volume, and 2025 will show which one moved.
Does transmission’s record survive?
Transmission set its 2024 record with transformer unit values up more than 60 percent since 2020. If equipment prices normalize, the dollar record could recede while grid construction continues. This chain is the cleanest test of price against volume in the data.
Do the risers keep rising?
Mexico, India, and Vietnam gained export and import share together through 2024, the signature of economies joining supply chains. A stall on either side of their ledger would mark the limit of the rerouting that carried them.
Does the battery exception persist?
American buyers cut China’s share of their clean imports in eight of the eleven chains between 2012 and 2024, while the China share of their battery imports more than doubled, to 32 percent. Whether batteries converge with the rest or keep diverging is the sharpest sourcing question in the data.