China-HQ green FDI is not a single mechanism. The same investment can occupy very different supply-chain positions depending on the country and technology where it lands. What matters is not the announcement, but the function the country performs in the chain.
Before asking where China-HQ capital lands, see the stakes. Across most clean-tech products, China gained share of third-market exports from 2012 to 2024 while the 2010 leaders lost it. Each dot is one product; the upper-left zone is where China gained share and the incumbents lost it. Third markets exclude China and the incumbent bloc as buyers, so this is the contest for neutral markets.
37 of 54 battery products shifted China's way. In lithium-ion cells, China rose to 54% of third-market exports while the Japan-Korea-US bloc fell from 32% to 10%: Japan, the original commercial cell producer, shed almost 12 points, Korea almost 9.
Open the battery competition chart
24 of 34 solar products shifted China's way. In cells and modules, China rose from 39% to 64% of third-market exports while the Germany-Japan-US bloc fell from 27% to 12%, Germany and Japan each shedding about 6 points.
Open the solar competition chart
69 of 86 EV products shifted China's way, the broadest move of any technology here. In battery-electric vehicles, China rose from about 1% to 26% of third-market exports while the Germany-Japan-Korea-US bloc slipped from 53% to 45%.
Open the EV competition chartEvery country scored for solar, battery, and EV on the same two questions, mapped. Most of the world is bypassed; a small set of countries carries the story. Each map opens in a simple overview; a view control adds outcome marks and regional lists as you need them. Start here, then read the two diagnostic lenses below.
155 countries colored by battery readiness quadrant. China-HQ battery FDI clusters in Europe and East Asia; optional outcome marks show where the bet has or has not shown up in exports.
Open the battery map
The same 155 countries scored for solar. A country can sit in a different quadrant for each technology, so the maps rarely match.
Open the solar map
156 countries scored for EV, the most FDI-active panel of the three: 37 colored cells against 29 for solar and 27 for battery. Hungary and Mexico carry the largest disclosed China-HQ EV bets, with Thailand, Brazil, and Indonesia next; Thailand carries the largest project count.
Open the EV mapFirst we ask where China-HQ capital landed. Then we ask what role the country played in exports afterward.
The first lens is the entry map. It sorts every battery, solar, and EV country-technology pair by two questions: did the country already have relevant capability before 2020, and did disclosed China-HQ capital arrive from 2020 to 2024?
The second lens is the role map. It tracks what appears in trade data afterward: finished products, factory tools and parts, processed materials and feedstocks, or a mixed portfolio losing relative share.
Use the first chart to see where countries started. Use the second to see what role the featured cases played in the export chain.
All 466 battery, solar, and EV country-technology pairs, sorted by pre-2020 capability and disclosed China-HQ investment from 2020 to 2024.
Open Lens 1
The fifteen featured cases grouped by export role: finished goods, equipment and tools, processed materials, vehicles and components, or mixed portfolios.
Open Lens 2The full panel is broad; these fifteen cases are the close reads. Together they show how the five supply-chain roles differ. The five EV cells all sit on existing auto-industry bases, so their test is finished-vehicle entry, not factory-base creation: three are established vehicle exporters, while Indonesia and Brazil are home-market entries where the capital arrived to serve protected domestic demand.
| Case | Starting position | China-HQ FDI | Finished-product share | Factory specialization | Export role |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hungary / Battery | Prepared Magnet | $11.8B | 94.1% | 1.36 -> 3.81 | Finished platform |
| Poland / Battery | Untapped Candidate | Absent in panel | 82.8% | 0.98 -> 2.25 | Finished platform |
| Vietnam / Solar | Prepared Magnet | $4.2B | 67.7%* | 0.88 -> 1.31 | Finished platform |
| Mexico / Battery | Bypassed | Absent in panel | 13.0% | 0.37 -> 0.41 | Equipment integrator |
| Malaysia / Solar | Prepared Magnet | $3.3B | 1.2%* | 2.78 -> 3.04 | Equipment platform |
| USA / Solar | FDI-First Experiment | $2.16B panel; $1.16B audited screen | -4.7% | 1.27 -> 1.07 | Equipment platform |
| Indonesia / Battery | FDI-First Experiment | $6.9B | 2.2% | 0.21 -> 0.26 | Midstream platform |
| Indonesia / Solar | FDI-First Experiment | $17.6B panel; $6.07B audited screen | 12.9% | 0.14 -> 0.18 | Midstream platform |
| Saudi Arabia / Solar | FDI-First Experiment | $2.6B | 0.0% | 0.07 -> 0.04 | Feedstock platform |
| USA / Battery | FDI-First Experiment | $4.38B panel; $3.66B audited screen | 31.0% | 1.19 -> 0.94 | Hybrid case |
| Hungary / EV | Prepared Magnet | $4.8B | 29.9% | 1.17 -> 1.25 | Vehicle platform |
| Mexico / EV | FDI-First Experiment | $3.8B panel; $2.8B audited screen | 34.0% | 1.28 -> 1.25 | Vehicle platform |
| Thailand / EV | Prepared Magnet | $2.1B | 4.7% | 1.18 -> 1.16 | Component base |
| Indonesia / EV | FDI-First Experiment | $1.26B | 0.5% | 0.28 -> 0.17 | Midstream platform |
| Brazil / EV | FDI-First Experiment | $1.72B | 0.1% | 0.19 -> 0.15 | Home-market producer |
Factory specialization is measured with RCA. Values above 1.0 mean the country is specialized in factory-stage exports for that technology.
The same investment headline can correspond to very different jobs in the chain.
Hungary, Poland, and Vietnam show the clearest finished-product specialization. Hungary and Vietnam combine pre-existing capability with China-HQ capital. Poland reaches a similar export position without disclosed China-HQ FDI in this panel.
Mexico, Malaysia, and USA/Solar specialize in the machinery, components, and industrial tools used by other green-manufacturing systems. In Mexico, 88.4% of the battery-basket export delta is absorbed by the United States and Canada.
All three of Indonesia's cases, together with Saudi/Solar, follow resource and petrochemical pathways into clean-tech supply chains. Even Indonesia's EV-basket growth is mostly alumina and nickel. The export outcome is materials specialization rather than finished-product assembly.
USA/Battery expands across cells, electrolyte, and equipment, but no single HS segment dominates. Factory-stage RCA falls from 1.19 to 0.94, indicating diversification alongside relative-share decline.
Hungary, Mexico, and Thailand enter the EV window as established vehicle exporters with factory-stage specialization above 1.0; the test is finished-vehicle entry, which Hungary (29.9%) and Mexico (34.0%) show and Thailand (4.7%, mostly multi-use integrated circuits) does not yet. Indonesia and Brazil are the home-market contrast: China-HQ assembly capital arrived to serve protected domestic demand, and neither exports finished vehicles at scale.
By 2024, just one of the low-capability countries that received China-HQ FDI had become a specialized exporter of factory-stage battery or solar goods: the cells, components, and equipment, not the raw or processed materials. That country is Cambodia, and its solar surge is the documented US-tariff circumvention route, not homegrown capability.
The test is whether a country becomes a specialized factory-stage exporter, measured as a relative export advantage (RCA) of 1.0 or more in cells, components, and equipment. Under the panel definition, one of 24 FDI-First cases crossed that line from below; under the stricter audited-HQ definition, the same one of 24 crossed. That case is Cambodia solar, whose factory-stage exports jumped from near zero to over 1.7 billion dollars in the 2022 to 2024 window. Cambodia is the canonical destination for solar transshipment after US antidumping and countervailing duties on mainland Chinese cells and modules, so the crossing reads as final-assembly relocation to route around tariffs, not indigenous capability formation. The other 23 cases did not cross: a few stayed above 1.0 but started there and weakened, and others began just under the line and slipped further below.
That does not mean the investments failed. Large battery and solar projects take years to reach commercial output. Battery plants often need two to four years after announcement. Polysilicon and PV-glass facilities can take three to five. The real test for the largest FDI-First projects comes after 2027, when enough production should appear in trade data, and when a later window can separate durable capability from tariff-driven routing.
Each mini-card names the role, the key number, and the caution. Battery, Solar, and EV are separated so the sector stories can be read independently. All fifteen cases carry full methods-register case notes, linked in the Methods rail.
Sells the final battery cell. Much of the measured export jump comes from plants already operating before recent China-HQ megaproject output could appear.
Reaches the same final-cell role without China-HQ Battery FDI in this panel. Korean and broader European capital matter here.
Battery cells, electrolyte, and equipment all grow. The United States is a domestic-market platform, the largest net finished-cell importer in the panel at minus 18 billion dollars, so the factory-stage export RCA dip reflects home absorption and faster global export growth, not a failed buildout. Export RCA is the wrong yardstick for a domestic-market recipient.
Supplies equipment and components into the North American battery buildout. The USA and Canada absorb 88.4% of the basket delta.
Works as a battery-materials supplier. Nickel and cathode precursor exports grow; cell export entry does not.
Ships finished solar modules. It is the closest Solar parallel to Hungary/Battery, with factory-stage specialization crossing 1.0.
Sells solar tooling and intermediates, not more finished modules. The original ASEAN solar incumbent moved toward equipment.
Solar equipment and intermediate exports rise while finished-module exports fall. The United States is a domestic-market platform, the largest net finished-module importer in the panel, so finished-export RCA understates the buildout rather than signaling a weak export base. Output serves home demand under the IRA, not export.
Growth is alumina and ammonia, both multi-use commodities and not governed by any solar-specific policy. Reads as midstream growth that could feed solar, not demonstrated solar entry. Xinyi-era output is not yet in the trade window.
A single feedstock, ammonia, drives 72% of the growth. Ammonia is a generic petrochemical, so this reads as commodity export growth adjacent to solar, not solar-specific entry.
The clearest EV capability-formation case: modeled competitiveness rises from 0.11 before the window to 0.79 by 2024, and finished battery-electric vehicles enter from near zero to 29.9% of the export-growth delta, run 53% into the EU. But the BYD Szeged anchor completed in 2023, so the pre-existing auto base carried most of the measured trade.
Labelled FDI-First only because the EV window barely predates Mexico's ramp: competitiveness jumps from 0.09 to 0.84. Finished vehicles enter at scale, 81.5% into the United States, but this is the existing North American auto industry electrifying, not the China-HQ EV capital, most of which is announced or just commenced. Under the audited-HQ screen the 3.8 billion dollars falls to 2.8.
The panel's largest China-HQ EV project count, 12 projects and 2.1 billion dollars disclosed, on an incumbent auto-assembly base. The measured export growth is 54% multi-use integrated circuits shipped to the United States, not vehicles; finished battery-electric vehicles are 4.7% of the delta and run mostly to Japan. Most plants completed in 2022 to 2024, too recent to appear in the trade window.
A home-market experiment pulled by an import-now, produce-later incentive scheme: 1.26 billion dollars across 6 projects, led by BYD Subang, landed in a country with no measured EV capability. The trade data reads Indonesia's commodity story a third time, 87% alumina and nickel, while BEV sales grew from 120 units in 2020 to over 100,000 in 2025, four-fifths of them Chinese brands. Every large plant is post-window.
The cleanest tariff-wall case: a published import-duty ladder rising from 10% in January 2024 to 35% by July 2026 preceded an import surge and then localization, converting BYD's largest overseas export market into its largest plant outside Asia. Both plants began output in mid-2025, after the trade window, so the measured growth is incumbent parts trade to Mercosur plus alumina, with finished-vehicle exports near zero.
The data identify export roles. They do not, by themselves, prove what caused those roles to emerge.
The largest FDI-first projects need time to appear in trade data. A later export window is the main follow-up.
The next version should add an adjacent-capability measure for Mexico-type cases, tighten the Solar finished-product proxy with an HS22 cross-walk, and keep panel-rule and audited-HQ magnitudes side by side in the scored table.